Author: Amitav Acharya (Distinguished Professor, School of International Service of International Relations, American University)
DOI: 10.30402/EAS.202506_56(1).0004
Is the Western-led world order collapsing? Or is it simply losing its monopoly on defining what order looks like? Since the early twenty-first century, growing uncertainty has surrounded the future of global governance. As emerging powers assert themselves and Western unity weakens from within, there is a growing recognition that the liberal order is increasingly fragile. But as Amitav Acharya argues in The Once and Future World Order: Why Global Civilization Will Survive the Decline of the West, the global order is not unraveling. Instead, it continues to be built not on a single hegemon, but as an amalgamation of many past world orders. The world does not need a single leader to function; it has always drawn from a diversity of civilizations, ideas, and systems.
Rather than embracing pessimistic views of collapse, Acharya challenges the dominant discourse by reframing the current moment as a historical turning point—one that signals not the end of order, but the emergence of a more diverse and inclusive one. He argues that the current world order is coming to an end. Yet this shift marks not a collapse, but the birth of a new multiplex world order. This new configuration could benefit many nations and states that have been previously excluded from what he calls the “global groupthink” of the liberal international order. Drawing on over 5,000 years of global history, Acharya contends that the foundations of global order were never solely Western. Instead, they are the cumulative product of many civilizations, regions, and political traditions across time.
According to Acharya, the current liberal international order, often credited to the leadership of the United States, has delivered undeniable public goods: openness in trade, economic integration, and a certain degree of security. However, this system has never been fully inclusive. It primarily benefited the West, while many nations were excluded from its decision-making and benefits. Acharya acknowledges the crucial role the U.S. played, especially in East Asia’s development. However, he argues that this leadership came at a substantial cost to the U.S. itself and left the order inherently unbalanced.
Acharya views the decline of the liberal international order not as a sudden disruption, but as part of a longer-term trajectory. He notes that U.S. leadership had already begun to wane before the rise of Donald Trump, though Trump’s “America First” policies and disengagement from multilateralism accelerated the process. He notes that Trump did not initiate this decline but exacerbated it. The erosion of U.S. leadership, he emphasizes, has been underway for some time—an idea he previously explored in The End of the American World Order.[1] According to Acharya, the liberal order is not collapsing. It is simply losing its monopoly.
This perspective runs counter to what Acharya calls a “global groupthink” that frames U.S. leadership as the only viable foundation for world order. Instead, he argues that there is no monopoly on world order, but that it is shared among nations, and that “the rest always had the power to create a world order.” For Acharya, the core of global order has always drawn from many different civilizations and people from around the world. The world is not descending into chaos but entering a phase of more widely shared leadership and legitimacy.
To support his argument that the world order has never been solely the product of the West, Acharya cites historical examples from different continents and time periods. These examples show that norms of international conduct, trade, and humanitarian restraint appeared long before Western dominance and often developed independently across civilizations. He begins by noting that cultures separated by vast distances often developed similar ideas. For example, the Mongol trading system and the Indian Ocean network both enabled regional connectivity and the diffusion of ideas, long before globalization became a Western-led project.
Acharya then turns to historical precedents that reflect the principles of today’s world order, sometimes with eerily similar language. A notable example is the treaty signed between the Hittite Empire and Ancient Egypt in 1259 BCE. It includes ideas similar to those later found in the United Nations Charter. The treaty included clauses on non-aggression and mutual assistance during conflict, all principles that remain central to contemporary international law. Such agreements challenge the assumption that international law originated solely in the West.
In the realm of maritime order, Acharya questions the standard narrative that the Law of the Sea was founded by Hugo Grotius. He emphasizes that Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean societies had long practiced principles similar to the“freedom of the seas”. Acharya suggests that the Southeast Asian trading system shared many features with the modern United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Finally, Acharya points to similarities between the Code of Manu and the Geneva Conventions. The Code of Manu, an ancient Indian legal text, states that one must not harm a person who is already injured or who surrenders with their hands raised. It also includes a prohibition on the use of poison in warfare. These principles, Acharya notes, are echoed in the Geneva Conventions, showing that concepts of ethical warfare have long existed in non-Western traditions.
As a whole, these examples illustrate a central theme of The Once and Future World Order: that today’s international norms have roots in many civilizations, not just the West. As Acharya demonstrates, these ideas were not solely created by the West, but have been present in various parts of the globe throughout history.
Acharya also devotes attention to the changing role of the United States and the growing rivalry with China. While many observers worry that the U.S.–China competition signals the collapse of the global order, he argues that this shift has been underway for a long time. The liberal international order, which relied heavily on U.S. leadership, was never fully inclusive. It benefited the West but left out many other countries. Acharya acknowledges that East Asia’s development depended in part on the openness and security provided by the U.S., but this came at a high cost and created an unbalanced system.
Acharya further argues that the global shift is not merely due to America’s retreat, but also because this retreat is enabling new power structures to emerge. While Trump weakens the Western alliance system, he unintentionally creates more room for cooperation among non-Western actors. Acharya predicts that rising powers, middle powers, and regional actors will increasingly collaborate across traditional geopolitical boundaries, breaking the binary of “the West and the Rest.” This growing network of actors, which he terms a “global multiplex,” is accelerating the transition toward both a post-American and post-Western world order. He believes this new system will give more countries a voice and reflect a wider range of ideas and traditions.
Acharya suggests that the decline of Western dominance might reduce longstanding forms of inequality and conflict that have been sustained by imperial hierarchies and Western-centric norms. He questions the widespread tendency to measure civilizational progress solely through a Western lens, particularly one rooted in Greco-Roman traditions. Instead, he highlights the intellectual and political contributions of civilizations such as ancient India, China, Persia, the Mongol empire, Native American societies, and the Islamic world. Many of these traditions, he argues, were marginalized or erased through colonial domination and deserve renewed recognition in global discourse.
Acharya imagines a world where global leadership is no longer controlled by just one country. Instead, different places such as Moscow, Delhi, Beijing, Brussels, and Washington might each play a leading role in areas like security, trade, technology, or regional affairs. Acharya believes that history demonstrates how societies have been able to exchange ideas, engage in trade, and learn from one another, even amid conflict.
Still, this kind of shared world order also comes with risks. Ancient Indian thinker Kautilya warned that in the absence of a central authority, stronger countries may dominate weaker ones. He described this condition as matsyanyaya, or “the law of the fishes.” For Acharya, a multiplex world is not a perfect solution, but it reflects the reality of a diverse world. To avoid chaos, countries must build new ways to cooperate and create shared rules.
Beyond offering historical insights, The Once and Future World Order is also a response to how international relations (IR) is taught and understood today. Acharya argues that the dominant narratives in international relations, which are often rooted in Western-centric perspectives, tend to overlook the roles of colonization, racism, and the contributions of non-Western societies. He points out that foundational texts like Henry Kissinger’s World Order fail to acknowledge these elements, reinforcing a narrow and incomplete view of global history.
In contrast, Acharya’s book seeks to broaden the intellectual foundations of IR by emphasizing the contributions of many cultures and civilizations throughout history. He positions his book as a counterpoint to the idea that the decline of U.S. dominance necessarily signals the collapse of world order. While the path forward may be uncertain, Acharya remains hopeful that a more inclusive and equitable global system can emerge through shared leadership and the accumulated contributions of many civilizations. At the same time, he cautions against viewing the decline of American leadership as a sign of global disintegration. Such assumptions, he warns, could become self-fulfilling if they lead to instability or provoke unnecessary confrontation. Rather than surrendering to fatalism, Acharya urges scholars and policymakers to imagine alternative futures grounded in cooperation, mutual respect, and historical awareness.
Acharya does not suggest that a post-Western order will be free of tensions or contradictions. Instead, he contends that the decline of Western dominance could ease some of the inequalities and conflicts it helped sustain. In its place, a new structure may emerge that reflects a broader range of political experiences and intellectual legacies, whether this world will be more stable or just remains to be seen. But by recovering forgotten histories and questioning narrow definitions of progress, Acharya invites readers to imagine alternatives to a world order defined by hierarchy and exclusion. In doing so, The Once and Future World Order offers not only a historical critique of the current system, but also a call to rethink the sources, values, and possibilities of global leadership in a changing world.
[1] Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order. (Cambridge: Polity Books, 2014).